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 Executive summary 
 
Historically, the borders between Syria and Lebanon have been contested and porous. 
Between 2011 and 2013, the border areas witnessed mobility on both sides of the border: 
from Syria into Lebanon, where a steady flow of Syrians escaping war moved to and settled 
in Lebanon, and from Lebanon into Syria, where fighters and weapons entered Syria and 
were deployed to support either the regime or the opposition. Since then, these areas have 
become a central zone of contention and competition between several groups.  
Governance mechanisms in the border areas between Lebanon and Syria have therefore 
come to light as key determinants of stability or instability.  
Governance of these areas has historically been inscribed in a policy of marginalisation, state 
abandonment and reliance on Syria. Rather than the nature of governance in these areas, it is 
the actors involved that have changed after 2011. 
 
Marginalisation has remained a key feature in the governance of the border areas, despite the 
presence of a variety of new international and domestic actors, such as Syrian refugees, 
international NGOs, UN agencies and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Moreover, the 
Lebanese government response to the Syrian crisis and that of international agencies have 
further reinforced the marginalisation of these border areas within the Lebanese space. This 
is evident in the absence of development projects on the one hand, and the establishment of 
mechanisms of dependency on foreign aid on the other. 
 
Protecting the Lebanese national borders has become a key element in the discourse of both 
Hezbollah and the government. Beginning in 2014, the LAF gradually deployed its troops 
along the Lebanese borders. However, with Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria, a porous 
Syrian-Lebanese space has re-emerged through the military control of Hezbollah on the two 
sides of the borders.  
 
While the border areas are key to Lebanon’s stability and to political competition, they have 
remained economically and politically marginalised. This is largely due to their disconnection 
from an economic centre and to a principal reliance on precarious economic mechanisms, 
such as smuggling.  
 
The Lebanese state, along with the international organisations supporting it, should 
undertake development projects that render these areas less dependent on aid and more 
reliant on development and productive economic projects.  
These development projects would secure economic and social stability for the dwellers of 
these areas and would help to move away from governance at distance and marginalisation 
towards a type of inclusive and developmental governance.  
It is also important to create economic hubs within the Lebanese space on which the border 
areas can rely and integrate.  
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Humanitarian and development organisations should also put in place more robust 
coordination mechanisms in order to prevent corruption and waste. Such mechanisms 
should start by setting up an open database, including the number of refugees, their needs 
but also the resources of each and every border area.  
There is a need to include local NGOs and grassroots movements in the coordination and 
implementation mechanisms since they often have a deeper knowledge of and better 
accessibility to the field.  
The international community should remain committed to preserving the refugee rights in 
Lebanon, mainly by recognising such rights and status as refugees and not as displaced.  
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Introduction 
 
Historically, the Lebanese-Syrian borders have been contested, ill-defined and porous (Picard 
2006; Kaufman 2014; Picard 2016). The construction and dismantling of the Lebanese-
Syrian borders have depended upon a multitude of actors, historical events, and the wide 
political conjuncture. While the Lebanese border areas existed for a long time in the shadow 
of the political centre, they nonetheless remained reliant on and influenced by neighbouring 
Syria.  
 
This paper looks at how governance operated historically in Lebanon’s border areas and 
what changes have occurred since 2011, when the uprising in Syria erupted. It examines 
questions around who governs these areas and how marginalisation and (in)security are 
produced respectively.  
 
Fieldwork for this research was conducted from the period of January 2017 until May 2017. 
It relies primarily on snowball methods, through in-depth interviews with local activists, local 
and international NGOSs UN agencies, as well as with state representatives. 
 
The paper examines five case studies, geographically located along the Lebanese borders 
from North to South Lebanon. The first four are: Chebaa, a village in the South 
Governorate that shares borders with both Syria and Israel, Arsal and el-Qaa in the 
Baalback-Hermel Governorate, and Wadi Khaled in the Akkar Governorate, North Lebanon 
(see Map). The four areas share direct borders with Syria. The fifth case covers Barr Elias in 
the Bekaa Governorate, a village that does not share direct borders with Syria but is located 
five kilometers away from Masna’a, the largest official border crossing with Syria.  
 
These border areas continue to be abandoned by the state and geographically isolated from 
the political centre, with the exception of Barr Elias which is located on the main Damascus 
Road and benefits from direct access to both capitals, Beirut and Damascus (Bennafla 2006).  
 
The marginalisation of these areas is the result of an acute absence of development projects, 
a lack of political representation, and geographical distance from the political and economic 
centre in Lebanon (e.g. Beirut). As any border region, these areas have developed a structural 
dependency on the countries they share borders with. In this instance, the five areas have 
historically turned towards Syria and have largely become dependent on it. Reliance on Syria 
took several forms, from everyday smuggling to direct access to commodities and services 
including health care, education and consumer products that are less expensive than those 
available in Lebanon.  
 
With the outburst of the Syrian conflict in 2011, these areas witnessed major changes starting 
with the influx of refugees to the gradual militarisation and closure of the borders. Hence, 
the dwellers of these areas lost their historical and often unregulated access into Syrian 
territories, while succumbing to the pressure of the humanitarian refugee crisis. Previously 
absent actors have landed in these areas, specifically international humanitarian and 
development organisations, with the exception of the United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was deployed to the South in 1978. A limited number of state 
 5 
agencies have also recently marked their presence in these areas, beside those already in 
existence2.     
 
This paper first sheds light on the historical patterns that have defined the governance of the 
border areas in Lebanon. It then unpacks the political weight that these areas carry for 
Lebanon’s political leadership, when they become central to national politics despite their 
geographical marginalisation. It analyses the international response to the refugee crisis in 
these areas and its impact. Finally, it enquiries about these areas’ representation in the 
current political context and presents some key ideas on how to eventually contribute to 
their stability and development.  
 
Patterns of the Lebanese-Syrian Border Areas 
 
Areas that are historically hostile to the Lebanese state and marginalised by the political centre  
 
Since the declaration of the State of Greater Lebanon in 1920, these areas, previously not 
part of Mount-Lebanon, lost their direct social, economic and trade relations with Syria. 
Thereafter, they were annexed to Mount-Lebanon to form present-day Lebanon. At the 
same time, however, these areas were not economically, politically and socially integrated 
into the Lebanese state and they were governed at distance. This marginalisation and 
abandonment by the Lebanese state took several forms. For instance, the borders with Syria 
were not demarcated. In fact, borders and cadastral surveys were not conducted, leaving 
some of these areas under contestation with Syria (Hamadé et al. 2016). As a result, the 
borders were unitarily controlled by Syria, especially at times when the Syrian military was 
present in Lebanon (1976-2005). In addition, development projects were not implemented in 
these areas, which reinforced their sense of marginalisation.  
 
State disengagement from these areas was felt by the local populations in all respects. The 
state, however, was only present through its use of force against the latter. In 1958, for 
instance, most of these areas joined the revolution against Maronite President Camille 
Chamoun, receiving arms and support from Syria, and in turn causing violent reprisals by the 
state. Arsal in particular was bombarded from the air by the LAF in 1958, and seized by the 
security forces as a result of the 1963 contested local elections (Obeid 2010). In another 
episode in 1964, the LAF, according to local sources, also bombarded Wadi Khaled in order 
to suppress a local rebellion to protest the refusal of the state to grant dwellers the Lebanese 
nationality. Nationality was only granted later in 1994. In addition, the Arqoub area, which 
encompasses Chebaa, constituted the terrain for the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) to conduct resistance against Israel, in accordance with the Cairo Agreement of 1969 
(Norton and Schwedler 1993, 62).  
                                                           
2 For instance, the Social Development Centres (SDCs) at the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) continue to 
play a major role under the framework of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP). In addition, the Primary 
Healthcare Centres (PHCCs) at the Ministry of Health offering healthcare services to both Lebanese and 
Syrians. Public schools have a double shift (afternoon shift) to offer Syrian children education. And finally, in 
an attempt to face the so-called ‘security threats’ of the Syrian refugees, municipalities have recruited part-time 
municipal police officers, which were previously non-existent in some areas.  
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These patterns have contributed to hostility towards the Lebanese state and its political 
centre, which has reduced these areas’ security. On the other hand, these areas were less 
affected by the civil war between 1975-1990. El-Qaa, a Christian village, however, was not 
spared the impact of sectarian conflict with its Shiite surrounding (Hermel and Labweh). 
Wadi Khaled similarly witnessed sporadic sectarian clashes with neighbouring Qbayat.  
 
In the post-war period, these areas gradually fell under Syrian tutelage through the direct 
presence of Syrian military or secret services, with the exception of Chebaa, which was under 
Israeli occupation until 20003.  
 
To date, these areas continue to be neglected by the Lebanese authorities. This neglect takes 
multiple forms, whether political, through the lack of political representation, or economic, 
with a near-complete absence of state public development projects, in addition to 
infrastructure that might facilitate access to Beirut, except for the case of Barr Elias. In 
Sunni-majority Arsal and Chebaa, for instance, political representation is subject to the 
alliance between Shiite political parties Hezbollah and Amal. El-Qaa and Chebaa further 
suffer from population decline due to rural-urban migration or emigration outside Lebanon, 
which accelerated during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990).  
 
 
Reliance on Syria and border economy  
 
Against the backdrop of historical marginalisation, these areas oriented themselves towards 
Syria; more specifically towards Homs for Wadi Khaled, Arsal and el-Qaa and towards 
Damascus for Chebaa and Barr Elias. Therefore, economic life in these areas revolved 
around smuggling or what is locally known as “border trade” (Hutson and Long 2011). 
Locals simultaneously became ‘consumers’ of goods and services coming from Syria to meet 
their basic needs (food, medicines, schools and hospitals…), or/and ‘traders’ smuggling 
goods from Lebanon into Syria in order to meet the demands of Syrian society for ‘global 
products’ that are unavailable in Syria (electronic, cigarettes…). Economic exchange varied 
from large-scale formal trade, with el-Qaa constituting a transit zone to Syria, to everyday 
smuggling. Barr Elias witnessed the emergence of a large souk to cater for commuters’ 
demands between Syria and Lebanon on the Damascus Road. In the case of Wadi Khaled 
and Arsal, smuggling was profitable to such an extent that young people became less 
interested in securing jobs within public institutions. Economic exchange generally fostered 
relationships between Syria and Lebanon (marriages) and established continuous exchange 
between the areas and Syria (seeking leisure in Homs). Despite being economically 
profitable, however, informal trade made these areas vulnerable and dependent on Syria, as 
they were not immune to the economic consequences of the war in the neighbouring 
country.  
 
 
                                                           
3 It is important to clarify that the village Chebaa is not ‘the farms of Chebaa’, despite the connection that the 
inhabitants of the village established between the two areas. The Farms of Chebaa remain under the occupation 
of Israel and are subject to border delimitation controversies between Syria, Lebanon and Israel (Cimino 2010).  
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New development on the long-neglected Lebanon-Syria borders 
 
Following the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon in 2005 and the Israeli war 
against Lebanon in July 2006, the international community called upon both the Lebanese 
and Syrian governments to initiate a process of border demarcation. The objective of these 
emergent calls was not to put an end to the smuggling of goods and commodities. In fact, 
the main aim was to prevent the flow of arms into Lebanon for Hezbollah from across the 
borders (Blanford 2016). In this context, the UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted 
in August 2006, called explicitly for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, 
including areas where the border was historically unclear. It also called on the Lebanese 
government to “secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon 
without its consent of arms or related material”. In 2008, the Lebanese and Syrian 
government finally agreed to establish diplomatic ties, previously non-existent in the history 
of the two states, and to begin the process of demarcating Lebanon’s northern border. This 
did not take place before 2011.  
 
With the eruption of the Syrian conflict in 2011 and until very recently before the liberation 
of the Lebanon eastern border towns (the outskirts of Arsal and Ras Baalbeck) from ISIS 
and Jabhat al Nusra by Hezbollah and the LAF, the border areas were at the heart of major 
transformations succumbing to a double pressure of fighting in Syria and border closures. 
Although they were impacted negatively and dramatically, instability and insecurity in these 
areas cannot be strictly attributed to the so-called spillover of the Syrian conflict into 
Lebanese territory (Salloukh 2017). In fact, the conflict unfolded in such a way that Lebanese 
and Syrian actors became involved in it, transforming and placing these areas in the middle 
of an increasingly entangled conflict.  
 
Beginning in 2011, these areas experienced two main transformations. On the one hand, 
they saw varying degrees of military confrontation (clashes, bomb shells), except for Barr 
Elias and Chebaa. The latter remains strategically dependent on the evolution of the conflict 
with Israel. On the other hand, they faced an influx of refugees, which placed an 
unprecedented burden on the already feeble infrastructure.  
 
The events led to gradual border closures, at different times for each border area according 
to the evolution of the conflict in nearby Syrian towns. Between 2011 and 2013, the border 
areas witnessed mobility on both sides of the borders: from Syria into Lebanon, where a 
steady flow of Syrians escaping war moved to and settled in Lebanon, and from Lebanon 
into Syria, where fighters and weapons entered Syria and were deployed to support either the 
regime or the opposition. This period witnessed a temporary loss of control by the Syrian 
regime over parts of Syria’s territory, including some of its border crossings. The period was 
also marked by the involvement of Hezbollah in the Qusayr battle (2013).  
 
Between 2014 and 2017, the influx of refugees decreased. In October 2014, the Lebanese 
government adopted policies that prevented Syrians’ entry into the country (Favier 2016). In 
2016, forces allied with the regime including Hezbollah regained control over some of the 
lost territory, specifically those located close to the borders with Lebanon. Accordingly, the 
security of the Lebanese border areas cannot be dissociated from the security of the adjacent 
Syrian border areas, which are largely controlled by Hezbollah. This control turned 
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Hezbollah into a major actor in the Lebanese border areas. In July 2017, the refugee crisis in 
Lebanon witnessed an important yet very timid development, with some 30 refugee families 
returning to Syria from Arsal after Hezbollah after an agreement was brokered to secure 
their return. The Lebanese government was not involved in this process and the LAF’s role 
was reduced to escorting them to the borders4.  
 
More importantly, in August 2017 Hezbollah solely took upon himself the mission to 
liberate the outskirts of Arsal that were under occupation by ISIS militants. The victory was 
considered by Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of the party, as the ‘Second 
Liberation’, the first being the liberation of the South from Israeli forces in 20005. As a 
result, Hezbollah brokered an agreement with ISIS to deport their fighters and families into 
Syria.6  
 
 
Political Leaderships’ competition over border areas  
 
With the outbreak of the Syrian war, the Lebanese border areas became strategic zones in 
the power struggle between Lebanese and Syrian actors. The ‘return’ of the Lebanese state to 
the areas has been secured mainly through its military ‘face’, echoing with the strategies 
historically adopted towards these areas. At the same time, these border areas were also key 
in determining the balance of power among the Lebanese political leadership, specifically the 
Future Movement and Hezbollah.  
 
The return of the State through the LAF 
 
The LAF’s return to these areas represents the most salient face of the Lebanese state. The 
deployment of the LAF along the borders in these areas, however, was first and foremost 
subject to a political consensus among the Lebanese political leadership. Previously not 
present in both Arsal and Chebaa, the LAF began marking its presence along main border 
points in 2014. By contrast, the Internal Security Forces (ISF) are not present in at least three 
of the four border areas. The LAF’s return was welcomed and was often called for by the 
local populations, especially after the 2014 Battle of Arsal.  
The LAF mandate remains nevertheless oriented towards the fight against terrorism and the 
dismantling of Jihadi groups or terrorist networks. It is sometimes extended to include 
                                                           
4 Hassan Abdullah, “Refugees Return to Syria from Lebanon in Hezbollah-mediated Deal”, Reuters, July 12, 
2017; https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-lebanon/refugees-return-to-syria-from-lebanon-
in-hezbollah-mediated-deal-idUSKBN19X1Y6  
5 Refer to the full speech delivered by the Hezbollah Secretary General, September 30, 2017; 
https://english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=40517&cid=385#.WgL5T3Zx3IU   
6 For more information, see: Osseiran Hachem, “What Hezbollah’s Safe Transfer Deal with ISIS Means for 
Lebanon, NewsDeeply, August 28, 2017; https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/community/2017/08/28/what-
hezbollahs-safe-transfer-deal-with-isis-means-for-lebanon-syria  
 
 9 
border control and the barring of Syrian refugees into Lebanon, according to a decision of 
the Council of Ministers to close the borders in October 2014. Despite the state’s return to 
these areas, and despite LAF presence along the borders, control is not complete and these 
areas remain ‘grey zones’. In fact, smuggling is still active but restricted to mafia-like 
networks, and according to some sources, the authorities turn a blind eye to these trans-
border interactions, which have become a fundamental part of the war economy.  
LAF presence in the border areas has had direct consequences on local life in these areas. 
Both the Lebanese and Syrian populations residing in these areas have been encircled. This is 
specifically the case for el-Qaa, where the Syrians remain trapped in neighbouring Machari’ 
el-Qaa, as well as Arsal and to a certain extent Wadi Khaled. In Wadi Khaled, for instance, 
and from the outset of the crisis, the Syrian regime closed and militarised its side of the 
borders, while the LAF established a checkpoint in Chadra village, the main entrance into 
Wadi Khaled. This contrasts with Barr Elias, which remains accessible and part of a larger 
contiguous geographical unit. In fact, the security measures carried out by the LAF in Barr 
Elias are not visible and most probably operate through the local community and through 
distant control. Therefore, it is important to highlight that the border areas are not 
homogenous, and despite similarities in their governance, security measures vary according 
to the development of the Syrian conflict on the other side of the border.  
 
The waning power of the future movement and the increasing power of Hezbollah  
 
If the state has returned through its security apparatus to these areas, the role of political 
parties remains essential in defining their future. With the exception of el-Qaa, the other four 
areas are majoritarian Sunni and have not been spared the communitarian polarisation 
between the 14 March political alliance, led by the Future Movement, and the 8 March 
political alliance, led by Hezbollah. This polarisation, which dates back to 2005, was 
reactivated in 2011 when the Sunni leadership in Lebanon and its constituency pledged 
unconditional support to the Syrian revolution against the Assad regime. This support, 
however, has waned as a result of the power disequilibrium between the Future Movement 
and Hezbollah, since the latter is increasingly consolidating its power due to its intervention 
in the Syrian war. While both parties have agreed internally to distance Lebanon from the 
war in Syria, both continue to be engaged in the conflict inside the Syrian territory to varying 
degrees, independent of Lebanon’s state institutions and government policies.  
The Future Movement’s position has gradually changed over time from unconditional 
support to abandonment of the Syrian revolution. Following its military and political defeat 
in 2008, the Movement considered the Syrian revolution as a pretext and an opportunity to 
weaken Hezbollah, and to reestablish a new balance within Lebanon. The Future Movement 
championed the Syrian rebel fighters within Syria, with the result that the Sunni border areas 
were considered to be a ‘safe haven’ not only for Syrian refugees but also the Syrian 
opposition, especially the border area of Arsal. Some radical and Islamist opposition groups 
took advantage of this platform and replaced the mainstream Sunni leadership in Arsal. With 
the Syrian regime and Hezbollah gaining ground in Syria, the Future Movement’s role has 
been reduced to negotiating internal deals such as the recent electoral law, despite some 
speeches by its leader Saad Hariri to criticize Assad.  
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Further developments indicate that the Future Movement is weakening in these areas, 
specifically the closure of healthcare centres in Chebaa (2015) and Arsal (2016), which 
previously opened as part of Hariri’s philanthropic and political project. For the local 
populations in Chebaa and Arsal, and to a lesser extent in Wadi Khaled, Hariri is losing 
credibility and is no longer showing support, or it is unable to represent the aspirations of 
the Sunni community. This is clearly reflected in the weak political representation in those 
areas, where both Sunni parliamentarians in Chebaa and Arsal are not chosen by the Future 
Movement but rather by Hezbollah and Amal. Also, the Future Movement has retreated in 
the municipal elections and avoided direct confrontation with Hezbollah. In Chebaa 
specifically, and during the 2016 municipal elections, the Future Movement withdrew its 
support for an electoral list in favour of a consensual list with Hezbollah. This led some local 
activists to see the Future Movement’s political support as ephemeral and ‘treason’. In this 
context, the void left by the Sunni leadership has been replaced by Islamist groups, until 
2014 financed and supported by Gulf countries. These groups, such as the Jamaa Islamaiya 
and Salafists movement, continue to support the Syrian refugees in these areas.  
At the same time, the hegemony of Hezbollah is more and more evident. Engagement in 
Syria in support of the regime has not only given the party military control of the Lebanese 
border areas but also leverage to broker local deals that prevent sectarian clashes and secure 
the party’s constituencies in Lebanon.  
The involvement of Hezbollah in Syria, in addition to its political and military control in 
Lebanon’s border areas, has paved the way for the establishment of a trans-border zone 
under its direct and immediate control. It has effectively replaced the role previously played 
by the Syrian intelligence and army at least since 1990. The presence of Hezbollah on both 
sides of the border contributes to its porousness, despite LAF presence .  
 
Wadi Khaled and Barr Elias versus Arsal, el-Qaa and Chebaa  
 
These five border areas face similar problems. Due to the confessional homogeneity of Wadi 
Khaled and Barr Elias, these areas do not experience sectarian tensions with their immediate 
environments. Neither do they contend with internal security concerns and political sectarian 
competition. Homogeneity prevents the emergence of local sectarian discourse or identity 
politics similar to those found in Arsal and el-Qaa, which are Sunni and Christian villages 
respectively surrounded by Shiite-majority villages.  
By contrast, confessional diversity is often manipulated by national sectarian parties to serve 
their political interests. In Arsal and el-Qaa and to a certain extent in Chebaa, for instance, 
political parties carry weight and enjoy local representation while Wadi Khaled and Barr 
Elias have remained immune to the national political polarisation of 2005. In fact, local 
politics in Wadi Khaled and Barr Elias continue to be strongly and strictly defined by family 
politics with little interference or influence  from the leading national political parties. It is 
precisely for these reasons that political parties are less present in Wadi Khaled and Barr 
Elias, unlike other areas where contentious politics constitute the playground for political 
parties. Such areas therefore become central in defining or enriching the discourse of 
national sectarian parties.  
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The international response to the refugee crisis 
 
With the influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanese territory, the international community 
through its humanitarian and development agencies undertook the mission to support the 
refugees and Lebanon. It should be noted that the infrastructure for aid was already well-
established since the 2006 Israeli war against Lebanon, when numerous local and 
international NGOs were involved in development and humanitarian projects.  
 
Rethinking state weakness  
 
The generally-stated objective of the international response plan is to support the Lebanese 
state in the face of an unmatched refugee crisis and the risk of collapse, given its alleged 
weakness. The international community also aims to support the control of the border areas 
through the comprehensive Integrated Border Management (IBM) programme, for instance, 
which is funded by the EU7.  
The United Nations along with the government and civil society developed the Lebanon 
Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) to ensure that the humanitarian response equally benefits 
Lebanon and contributes to stabilising the country. In this sense, state agencies have become 
key partners in the humanitarian response and development. In fact, some ministries 
continue to take advantage of power to block some decisions and projects. For instance, 
some ministries refuse to implement projects that do not fall within the scope of the LCRP. 
At the same time, however, ministries do not have a strong presence on the ground, with the 
exception of the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), which is a key partner of UNDP in the 
Maps of Risks and Resources (MRR). It should be noted that the MRR is not a development 
plan but rather a mechanism to identify priorities for host communities through local 
municipalities. By contrast, the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities does not figure as a 
major actor in the LCRP despite wielding an extensive national administrative and security 
apparatus, including the Qa’imacan, governors (Muhafiz) and the International Security 
Forces (ISF).  
Despite the involvement of state ministries in the crisis, it is important to rethink state 
weakness in Lebanon (Mouawad and Bauman 2017). In fact, this weakness serves the 
interests of different actors who tend to legitimise their interventions or to fulfill their own 
political agendas in the name of the ‘weak’ state. It is in this context that the establishment of 
the ‘Ministry of State for Refugee Affairs’ took place. The ministry has acted as a key agent 
in promoting a narrative of insecurity and tension between host communities and Syrian 
refugees. This has enabled the government to request additional aid to foster the resilience 
of host communities and to provide services to the Syrians. During the 2017 Brussels 
                                                           
7 According to the European Council “Lebanon is the first country in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region to benefit from a comprehensive Integrated Border Management (IBM) programme which 
entered its second phase in 2016 with an additional envelope Of EUR 9 million”, Joint Staff Working Document 
Report on EU-Lebanon relations in the framework of the revised ENP, Brussels, May, 23, 2017, p. 3; 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10658-2017-INIT/en/pdf  
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conference, for instance, Lebanon’s government built a case to donors requesting funding of 
up to $10-12bn over 5 to 7 years to invest in infrastructure projects8.  
Ultimately, the international community’s agenda is coordinated with the political leadership, 
allowing both parties to secure their interests. The international community continues to 
pledge money in an attempt to keep the refugees in Lebanon away from Europe, while the 
Lebanese ruling elite at different levels of state institutions, either through ministries or 
municipalities, serve and feed their patronage and clientelism networks. In this sense, state 
agencies become key actors among an array of many others working on the ground, and the 
public state as a result does not rise above the fray of tensions and conflicts.  
In sum, the state is present in its ability to block decisions or to man the national borders 
through the LAF, along with the support of the international community, but it remains 
absent when it is most needed by the local community. This paves the way for more calls on 
the state by local populations for additional protection and support in order to deal with the 
vulnerable situation, and perhaps more importantly the unilateral control of Hezbollah over 
these areas.  
 
The municipality  
 
With the absence of efficient centralised policies towards the refugees due to political 
deadlock and institutional stalemate, the local municipal councils are considered to be the 
main implementing partners for humanitarian and development projects. The municipality 
emerged as an alternative to an inactive parliament and an uncooperative government. In 
fact, these local councils were judged efficient given its proximity to host communities and 
Syrian refugees alike.  
Despite being an important actor, however, the local municipality did not necessarily 
contribute to a more comprehensive and transparent implementation of the response. In 
most of the border areas, the municipal council’s role is limited to the figure of the mayor, 
who benefits from advanced executive prerogatives according to the Lebanese law. Most 
municipal council members lack experience in development work and coordination. This 
prevents the consolidation of a clear local development plan. The situation is further 
exacerbated when local feuds and family problems block council decisions and inhibit the 
council from acting as a neutral actor above the fray of local conflicts.  
Moreover, the municipal council is also seen by its members as an institution that might 
accumulate resources and expand the network of patronage on the local level, similar to how 
the government is perceived by the national ruling elite. In general, the municipality acts 
without oversight by international donor agencies, which do not have direct presence on the 
ground and govern by ‘remote control’ as not all their offices are in these areas, ultimately 
preventing accountability and monitoring.  
                                                           
8 Jad Chaaban, “Should Lebanon get more funds for hosting refugees?”, Al Jazeera, April 5, 2017; 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/lebanon-funds-hosting-refugees-
170405082414586.html  
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Nevertheless, the municipality benefits from a margin of leeway for actions and initiatives 
that are independent from the central authorities, which leads a municipal council in one 
area to have a completely different policy to that of another. In this sense, three border areas 
out of the five host a very high number of refugees, often exceeding the local population. As 
a result, the presence of the international community is considerable in Wadi Khaled, Barr 
Elias and Arsal, compared with a very limited presence in Chebaa or el-Qaa. The 
municipalities of the former have accumulated an ability and interest to negotiate with the 
international community in order to raise funds or influence aid projects. By contrast, in el-
Qaa and Chebaa, the municipal councils have a limited role to play, aside from the 
implementation of security measures through the municipal police or a curfew. This 
disinterest on the part of the councils might be related to a lack of funds or a result of the 
limited numbers of refugees. At the same time, in el-Qaa and Chebaa, religious institutions 
have taken the lead in providing aid and/or services to the refugees.  
Finally, the role of the governor (Muhafiz) varies from one governorate to another. When an 
initiative is undertaken to coordinate the response and the implementing actors on the 
ground, it is not institutional but rather personal. Consequently, it might be driven by 
political and sectarian considerations (Bekaa) or nourish clientelism (Akkar). In Akkar, for 
instance, the governor has established a Local Development Office (LDO) and has 
appointed the head of a local NGO, who is politically allied with him, as a consultant to this 
office. This action is seen by a number of local actors and organisations as a way to promote 
a project for political advantage. As for the governor of the Bekaa, he has decided to close 
down shops owned and run by refugees, which is often appropriated locally by some mayors 
to pressure Syrians and push them to leave for another area. Accordingly, the governor is 
not acting as a neutral actor, but rather as an actor embedded in a network of personal gains 
or sectarian considerations.   
 
“Civil Society”: Local Lebanese and Syrian NGOs  
 
It is worth nothing that many local and grassroots initiatives are active on the ground and 
play a major role in the response plan. Most of these initiatives, however, remain dependent, 
at least in their funding, on UN agencies and international NGOs.  
There are three kinds of local NGOs. On the one hand, there are those that monopolise 
funding and, given their presence in interagency meetings at the regional level, actively take 
part in the decision-making process of the response, such as Amel, LOST and Iqra’, which 
benefit from a  nation-wide presence. On the other hand, there are local initiatives that 
remain marginalised and do not take part in interagency meetings. They are very present on 
the local level and have in-depth knowledge of the situation. Finally, others have recently 
been created in order to take advantage of the funds and aid available.  
In addition to the local Lebanese NGOs, Syrian NGOs are also active on the ground. The 
latter face numerous problems including their inability to act as Syrian NGOs, and are 
obliged to be registered as Lebanese NGOs. Moreover, these initiatives do not take part or 
are completely marginalised by the LCRP. This negatively affects their chances for 
fundraising. Other constraints are legal because Syrian NGOs are not able to employ Syrians 
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who are not eligible to receive work permits. The employees consequently have limited 
access to the field as they find themselves in a legally vulnerable situation.  
It should be noted that in Akkar and Tripoli, Syrian local initiatives are rather absent. This is 
due to the fact that Syrian activists in these areas have been welcomed and endorsed by the 
local community, where they have integrated successfully, and they have therefore not felt 
the need to establish initiatives of their own. While in the Bekaa, Syrians are more organised 
and have established numerous initiatives since 2011 and continue to be active to date.  
Finally, Syrian local initiatives are generally divided into two categories: Islamist and non-
Islamist. Despite the limited funding from the Gulf that started in 2014, Islamist 
organisations are able to continue their work thanks to aid from the Syrian diaspora or other 
Islamist organisations based in Lebanon. Conversely, non-Islamist initiatives struggle to 
expand their work, let alone to sustain their projects on the ground.  
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Conclusion: The reproduction of insecurity and marginalisation 
 
Governance of the Lebanese border areas depends upon their marginalisation. This takes 
several forms, from political and security marginalisation to social and economic 
marginalisation.  
Military and security marginalisation  
On the military and security level, these areas are constructed as a ‘security threat’, vulnerable 
to the penetration of ‘terrorists’ from across the borders and therefore menacing to the 
stability of the country. In most cases, the LAF is present on these areas’ periphery and not 
inside the towns. This void is not always filled by the Internal Security Forces (ISF), which 
are not present in most of these areas (Wadi Khlaed, Arsal, and el-Qaa).  
Over time, and without officially declaring them as such, these areas have become, ‘military 
zones’, and their securitisation through the deployment of the LAF depends on consensus 
among the sectarian political leadership. Additionally, the international community 
contributes to constructing these areas as a security threat. Most UN agencies are not able to 
access these areas without a prior three-day notification, a measure imposed on them by the 
LAF. The media further feeds into the dynamics and often appropriates the different 
interests of the sectarian political leadership.  
Social insecurity: dependency and vulnerability  
Most humanitarian projects continue to be implemented according to an emergency logic.  
Until now, development projects have not been implemented. In most cases, governance by 
international humanitarian and development organisations is led from a distance without the 
direct presence of the main donors on the ground, which reduces accountability and 
monitoring. Moreover, active local NGOs tend to monopolise funding to the detriment of 
other grassroots movements that are often marginalised. All these dynamics contribute 
indirectly to keeping the local population dependent on aid, and not on long-term 
development projects. At the same time, the refugees’ legal vulnerability continues because 
the Lebanese government does not acknowledge their status as refugees and limits their 
ability to work. Consequently, they remain vulnerable and subject to control as the 
government maintains their vulnerability and inability to commute or work.  
What do these areas currently represent?  
Despite the advent of new actors to the border areas – such as Syrian refugees, international 
NGOs, UN agencies and the LAF – and despite consolidating the long-contested borders 
trough their closure, as well as the emergence of a discourse by the Lebanese government 
and Hezbollah to protect the national borders, the post-2011 period has witnessed the 
reemergence or even the exacerbation of the precarity and marginalisation of these border 
areas. This is evident in the absence of development projects on the one hand, and the 
creation of precarious dependency on foreign aid on the other hand.  
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At the same time, a Lebanese-Syrian space has been reproduced that defies the concept of 
borders. In fact, the border does not serve to demarcate Lebanon from Syria, but rather 
opens up a Syrian-Lebanese space under the supervision or control by Hezbollah that before 
2005 was otherwise controlled by the Syrian army.  
These areas’ governance is not independent from the dynamics unfolding in the Syrian 
territory. Although these border areas are central to political competition, they remain 
economically and geographically marginalised.  
It is important to look at these spaces as areas of opportunity that are central to the 
Lebanon’s stability. There is a need to move away from governance at distance and 
marginalisation and towards a type of inclusive and developmental governance. This implies 
undertaking development projects that would secure economic and social stability for the 
dwellers of these areas.  
According to the perceptions and aspirations of Lebanese local communities, the border 
areas will play a key role in Syria’s reconstruction. There is a possibility that their 
marginalisation will persist, keeping them governed from a distance. It is exactly because of 
this that the Lebanese state, along with the international actors present in these areas, should 
rethink their approach in the future in order to avoid further marginalisation, but most 
importantly to connect and integrate them in the Lebanese space.  Indeed, these areas will 
redefine the relationship between the Lebanese state and the Syrian state.  
It is important to create economic hubs upon which the border areas can rely and integrate. 
These areas’ marginalisation is not necessarily due to their location at the border, but largely 
due to being disconnected from an economic centre and relying chiefly on precarious 
economic mechanisms (smuggling etc.) The example of Barr Elias confirms that 
development and accessibility to major economic hubs constitute major elements of stability.  
Humanitarian and development organisations should also put in place more robust 
coordination mechanisms in order to prevent corruption and waste. Such mechanisms 
should start by setting up an open database, including the number of refugees, their needs 
but also the resources of each and every border area. This database will contribute to 
preparing a holistic response plan that is not limited to emergency alone but directed 
towards long-term development projects that will eventually secure jobs for both Lebanese 
and Syrians.  
Coordination mechanisms should be inclusive and not only restricted to UN agencies and 
already well-established NGOs. In fact, there is a need to include local NGOs and grassroots 
movements in these mechanisms since they often have a deeper knowledge of, and 
accessibility to, the field.  
The international community should remain committed to preserving the refugee rights in 
Lebanon, specifically while their return to Syria will not likely happen in the near future. If 
return happens, it should also be safe and not by force. Meanwhile, the international 
community should deploy every effort possible to prevent the legal insecurity of Syrians 
living in Lebanon, by recognising their rights and status as refugees and not as displaced.  
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